Preserving Electronically Encoded Evidence by Robert, E. Davis
Seeking to preserve electronically encoded 
evidence implies that an incident or event 
has occurred requiring fact extrapolation for 
presentation, as proof of an irregularity or illegal 
act. Whether target data are in transit or at rest, 
it is critical that measures be in place to prevent 
the sought information from being destroyed, 
corrupted or becoming unavailable for forensic 
investigation. 
Anticipating this potential scenario requires 
information security management to proactively 
construct incident response and forensic 
investigation capabilities, considering legal 
imperatives. Evidence at rest or in transit requires 
adequate security procedures to ensure evidential 
nonrepudiation. Consequently, procedures 
addressing the infrastructure and processes for 
incident handling should exist within the security 
response documentation inventory. 
InterceptIng Data 
To enable the demonstration of due care, 
extracting in-transit electronically encoded 
evidence should be sanctioned through approved 
authorization procedures. Legitimate in-transit 
data extraction is commonly known as lawful 
interception (LI). LI is generally recognized as 
the legally endorsed official right to access private 
communications. The means and authority for 
conducting LI are often recorded in governmental 
laws or regulations. Such mandates include, but 
are not limited to:
•  US Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994
•  The Netherlands’ Act Aftappen 
Telecommunications Network and Public 
Services of 1998
•  UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA) of 2000
•  Part XI Section 88 of Germany’s 
Telecommunication Act of 2004 
Regarding IT-related transmissions, LI 
supports information extraction activities when a 
network operator or service provider grants law 
enforcement officials accessibility to monitor, 
review, tag and/or capture communications 
of suspect private individuals or groups. For 
instance, LI can be utilized to capture an 
employee’s inbound as well as outbound data 
packets to specifically identify delays and/or 
inconsistencies in transactional treatment. 
Generally, as suggested in the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) informational 
request for comment (RFC) 3924, “Cisco 
Support for Lawful Intercept in IP Networks,” 
management should ensure that the entity’s 
personnel are unable to perform LI processes 
themselves. Furthermore, the deployed  
LI process should:
•  Prevent detection by targeted parties
•  Ensure that appropriate authorized personnel 
know about specific interceptions 
•  Disable the capability for separate agencies 
targeting a subject to detect each other during 
electronic evidence collection
Adherence to these constructs will normally 
aid in ensuring legal evidence admissibility. 
extractIng StoreD Data
Primarily, all potential electronically captured 
evidence should be protected (as soon as 
possible) from deletion, contamination, 
modification and inaccessibility. When dealing 
with stored data, prudent information security 
management dictates informing appropriate 
parties that evidence will be sought through 
electronic discovery from the target IT—
establishing specific protocols that address 
preserving electronically encoded evidence 
and enforcing eradication restrictions for data 
residing within the target IT. In addition, when 
feasible, electronically captured evidence should 
be stabilized in the environment that existed 
during the suspected inappropriate activity. 
Conditionally, if the target system is turned 
off, simply turning the technology on and 
permitting a “boot” can introduce content 
changes to files directly or indirectly connected 
through operating system procedures. Some files 
interacting with the IT boot process may not 
be of interest to an investigation. Nevertheless, 
IT boot configuration modifications can cause 
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previously deleted files—containing pertinent information—to 
become irretrievable. 
When circumstances will not permit the maintenance of 
the embryonic operational state and site until law enforcement 
authorities arrive or when management accepts lawful 
extraction risks, data acquisition procedures may be invoked 
for evidence preservation. Data acquisition procedures involve 
the process of transferring encoded content into a controlled 
location, including electronic media types associated with an 
incident or event. 
Upon commitment to this course of action, all earmarked 
hardware media, as well as the target content, should be 
protected during transference to another medium, through 
an approved methodology. 
However, capturing 
volatile data (such as open 
ports, open files, active 
processes, user logons 
and other random access 
memory information) 
is also critical in most 
situations where evidence 
integrity can become an 
issue. By definition, volatile data are transient electronic bits. 
Therefore, without adequate precautions, volatile data cease 
to exist when information technology is shut down.
Volatile data capture assists investigators in determining 
the system state during the incident or event.
ImagIng Software
Creating evidential copies through routine backup procedures 
will permit replicating only specific files, while none of the files 
with delete indicators nor the designated “free space” between 
files is recovered. To remediate this limitation, task-oriented 
software should be used to obtain a forensic image. Appropriate 
forensic-imaging software reproduces an exact working copy 
of the original media’s content. Technologically, media content 
imaging can be carried out without launching the computer’s 
operating system, thereby avoiding tempering allegations, if 
acquired electronic evidence is utilized for prosecuting criminal 
misconduct. Functionally, applied imaging software should be 
capable of making an exact replication of every encoded bit 
contained on the target media.
Forensic-imaging software can capture residual data on 
targeted drives. Residual data include deleted files, fragments 
of deleted files and other data that still exist on the electronic 
media’s recording surface. With appropriate tools, even 
data commonly considered destroyed can be recovered 
from a magnetized surface for forensic analysis. Effective 
imaging replicates a disk surface sector-by-sector, as opposed 
to reproduction file-by-file. Depending on the product, 
imaging software can also generate a log file recording of IT 
parameters, such as disk configuration, interface status and 
data checksums, that are critical for supportable conclusions 
regarding an incident or event.
Functionally sound imaging software and practices are 
essential to maintaining evidential continuity. Specifically, 
after creating at least two certifiable media images, one 
replication can be inserted as a target system substitute  
for the original media, while the second replication can be 
utilized for forensic analysis. Once facsimiled, the original 
media should be sealed in a sterilized container, labeled and  
stored as evidence in a secure area until required for  
judicial proceeding.
concluSIon
In summary, whether target data are in transit or at rest, it 
is critical that measures be in place to prevent the sought 
information from being destroyed, corrupted or becoming 
unavailable for forensic investigation. When evidence is 
at rest, adequate procedures should be followed to ensure 
evidential nonrepudiation. Volatile data capture assists 
investigators in determining the system state during the 
incident or event. Consequently, the utilization of functionally 
sound imaging software and practices is essential to 
maintaining evidential continuity.
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technology on and 
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can introduce content 
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